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LEGAL CAPACITY OF ADJUDGED
INCOMPETENTS
FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW
Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law

The Colorado statute defines an "incompetent" as any person
who is "incapable, unassisted, to properly manage-his property-," I and provides for the appointment of a conservator when
a person has a "real or personal estate," whereupon he is to be
committed to the "care of some
person or institution" as an incom2
petent as previously defined.
Shapter v. Pillar3 was decided under the statute of 1893, but
the definition of an incompetent therein was substantially the
same as the above. There, the court said:
The main object of the statute is the protection of
the property of those mentally afflicted; inquiry must
be made as to the extent of such mental infirmity. If
it causes the person to be "unable to act intelligently
with respect to his business affairs" or prevents him from
acting in a "provident manner in the management of his
property interests, the statute is satisfied." However,
although the mind may be unsound, "if there be capacity
to manage, as the result of consecutive reasoning, although the management might not be such as intellectual
vigor and skill might approve," the person doesn't come
within the purview of the statute.
In a later case, 4 the court adopted substantially the same
definition, saying the legal test of insanity is whether the person
is "incapable of understanding and appreciating the extent and
effect of business transactions in which he is engaged." This is
in accord with the general rule on capacity to contract and execute
legal instruments.
THE CAPACITY TO CONTRACT

1935 C.S.A., Ch. 105, sec. 20, provides:
All contracts, agreements, and credits with or to any
such lunatic, shall be absolutely void as against such persons, his or her heirs, or personal representatives; but
persons making such contracts or agreements with any
such lunatic shall be bound thereby at the election of his
or her conservators.
The statute seems to be too clear to admit comment, and there
are no Colorado cases interpreting it.
THE CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL

The Colorado court has said that contractual capacity and
testamentary capacity are the same,5 and further, that an adjudi'COLO.
STAT. ANN., C. 105, § 1 (1935).
2
Ibid., § 9.
'28 Colo. 209, 63 P. 302 (1900).
'Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P. 2d 256 (1946).
5Ibid.
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cation of incompetency does not operate as "a conclusive bar to
the making of a valid will" by the decedent so long as it remains
in effect, since the "effect of a guardianship may be overcome
by proof that the testator was mentally competent at the time
the will was executed." 6
THE CAPACITY TO COMMIT A TORT

There are no Colorado cases on this question. However, the
general rule appears to be that an insane person is liable for his
own torts, 7 unless the particular tort involves a specific intention
which he is incapable of entertaining.8 Further, the liability is
not affected by the fact that the defendant was under guardianship at the time.9 However, compensatory damages only can be
recovered against him. 10
THE CAPACITY TO MARRY

Williams v. Williams 11held that a marriage "to a lunatic" is
"absolutely void." A later case 12 applied the same rule.
THE CAPACITY TO BRING AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE

The one Colorado case with dictum on the subject 13 indicates
that an insane person cannot bring an action for divorce, since
such an action is based on a "voluntary decision" to terminate
the marriage, which decision "an incompetent person cannot
make." The court states the general rule as being that "an insane
person has a legal capacity to sue, . . . provided he has not been
divested of the power to act for himself by having been adjudicated
incompetent and having been placed under guardianship." 14 However, the particular action was not for divorce, but rather concerned the right of a conservator to bring an action to annul the
marriage of his ward on the ground of the latter's insanity. This,
it was held, the conservator could do under the decision in Williams
v. Williams, supra.
'Martin v. Reid, 106 Colo. 69, 101 P. 2d 25 (1940).
'Roberts v. Hayes, 284 Ill. App. 275, 1 N. E. 2d 711 (1936); Shedrick v.
Lathrop, 106 Vt. 311, 172 A. 630 (1934).
'Chaddock v. Chaddock, 130 Misc. 900, 226 N. Y. S. 152 (1927); Sweeney
v. Carter, 24 Tenn. App. 6, 137 S. W. 2d 892 (1939).
9Morain v. Devlin, 132 Mass. 87, 42 Am. R. 423 (1882).
lOUllrich. v. N. Y. Press Co., 23 Misc. 168, 50 N. Y. S. 788 (1898), McIntyre
v. Sholty, 121 Ill.660, 13 N. E. 239 (1887).
1 83 Colo. 180, 263 P. 725 (1927).
12 Cox v. Armstrong, 122 Colo. 227, 221 P. 2d 371 (1950).
Is Ibid.
"See, also: COLO. RULES OF CIV. PRO(!., 17C(c) providing that the appointed
representative of an incompetent may sue on behalf of the latter; that if the
representative fails to act, the incompetent may sue by his next friend or
guardian ad litem, and further, that the Court shall appoint a representative
for an incompetent not otherwise represented in an action.
See, also: 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, see. 136, providing that conservators shall
be allowed to prosecute actions on behalf of their wards.

